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Abstract.
We present a simple model of endogenous commodity policy, in which (i) government action
is affected by the size of private inventories, and (ii) private inventories are determined by
speculators trying to forecast government action. The interaction between these two forces is
rich, giving rise to the possibility of bubbles and extrinsic volatility in a market which in the
absence of government would have had a unique, well-behaved, equilibrium. In addition,
under some conditions a government that wishes to support the price but is unable to commit
to future action may be impotent; and a government that does not want to support the price
may be "trapped" into doing so anyway by the activity of speculators.
1. Introduction.
The presence of government in many commodity markets is so ubiquitous and heavy
handed that it is impossible to understand the behaviour of those markets without giving some
thought to commodity policy'. As a result, the positive economics of commodity markets has
long made a lot of room for policy, in two principal ways. First, there is a strain of literature
that analyzes rational expectations equilibrium in commodity markets with an exogenous
policy rule imposed2. In this approach, causation runs from policy to market behaviour.
Second, there is a strain which attempts to explain commodity policies as the product of
optimizing government behaviour3. In this approach, causation runs from market conditions
to policy.
Here, we claim that these separate literatures, by remaining separate, have missed
something important. Specifically, this paper tries to untangle the mutual effects of private
agents' behaviour and policy in commodity markets when policy is endogenous. The point
1
 The heavy hand of policy in domestic agricultural commodity markets is well known.
See Johnson (1973) and Gardner (1992) for surveys. International commodity markets have
also been heavily regulated through buffer stocks, export quotas, subsidies, acreage controls,
and other instruments. For useful histories see Nappi (1979) and Finlayson and Zacher
(1988), and for a review see Gilbert (1987).
2Some pioneering contributions are Salant (1983) and Wright and Williams (1984). For
an application to the soybean market, see Miranda and Helmberger (1988). For a survey, see
Williams and Wright (1991, Chapters 13 and 14). All of these studies posit an exogenous
policy rule, given that rule, the implementing authority responds in the prescribed way to the
market from day to day, but there is no consideration given to how the rule is established.
3See Gardner (1987) and Babcock, Carter and Schmitz (1990) for efforts focused on US
farm price supports. See Gardner (1983, 1992) for a unified theoretical treatment and a
survey, respectively. This can be thought of as a special case of the general theory of
regulation outlined by Peltzman (1976).
2made here is that the interaction between government discretion and private speculation can
dramatically change the nature of equilibrium in the market for a storable primary commodity,
and can indeed make the outcome indeterminate.
More specifically, a simple nonstochastic model is presented in which there is a
unique (trivial) equilibrium if there is no government. When a rational, optimizing
government is added, multiple equilibria and extrinsic volatility can result. Among the range
of outcomes thus made possible, welfare differences are large.
The mechanism through which these phenomena arise is the effect of private
inventories on the government's incentives to intervene in the market. In this model, the
government would always have some interest in price supports for political reasons and
because of national monopoly power, but the benefits from the policy may not be worth its
cost. In general, the net gain from price supports may be affected either positively or
negatively by the level of private inventories. In the former case multiple equilibria may
result, and in the latter case extrinsic volatility may result. Briefly, if the net gain from price
supports is increasing in private inventories, a surge in speculative enthusiasm fueling
speculative demand can create the large inventories needed for a policy of price supports to
be politically justified. In that case, the speculative enthusiasm indeed leads to price supports
and thus higher prices, and is self-fulfilling. By contrast, if the net gain from supports is
decreasing in private inventories, it may be that no expectations can be fulfilled in a
nonrandom equilibrium; bullish expectations lead to high stocks and no price supports, hence
low prices, and bearish expectations lead to low stocks and active supports, hence high prices.
The only equilibrium is random. The paper makes an attempt to sort out when these various
outcomes are most likely4.
In addition, the interaction between speculation and government discretion can lead to
situations in which the government wishes to initiate price supports, but cannot because of
speculative pessimism; and cases in which the government does not want supports but is
"trapped" into establishing them anyway by speculative enthusiasm. In the latter case, which
always involves a large welfare loss, it is speculative hoarding that backs the government into
a corner. Thus, the presence of government and its inability to commit result in a possibility
of socially destructive hoarding that would be impossible in the absence of government.
This analysis can be applied to any market with a storable commodity in which some
government has an incentive to try to support the price. Thus, U.S. and EC farm policy fit
the setting of the model, as do withholding policies often employed by exporting countries
with market power. Examples of these latter include the valorization policy followed by pre-
war BraziP and schemes implemented by consortia of exporting countries, such as with coffee
at the moment and tin in the early 1930's6. These all have in common a government
4
 A similar logic could be applied to the planting of a perennial crop with sunk costs
and delayed output; as with speculators, the planters need to forecast future government
policy in deciding whether or not to plant, and at the same time their collective decisions
largely determine government policy. Throughout, although the discussion will be entirely
about speculative behaviour, it will be well to keep in mind an extension to planter behaviour.
5This was a policy of government purchase for storage or destruction in order to raise the
world price; at the time Brazil supplied a majority of world consumption. See Krasner
(1973).
6See Fox (1971, pp. 151-4).
intervening to raise the price7 of the commodity in order to help producers, at the
expense of taxpayers and consumers. The case of International Commodity Agreements
(ICA's), negotiated under United Nations auspices with producer and consumer country
participation, is similar in practice because often there is an explicit element of transfer from
consumers to producers in the arrangement, which the consumer country governments accept
as a form of foreign aid8. Thus, once again, the object is often to raise the price. In these
sorts of markets, speculation is usually very active, with much speculative attention applied to
forecasting government action'; and government behaviour is much affected by private
inventories'0. Those elements are the key to the model.
This model is also related to the theory of "hoarding"; price destabilizing speculation;
7Strictly speaking, we should distinguish between policies that raise the world price and
the domestic price (as U.S. farm policies before the mid-1980's; see Carr, et al (1988)) and
those that raise the domestic price but lower the world price (as is likely the case with current
U.S. and E.C. policies; see Babcock, et. al., (1990)). The model in this paper, taken literally,
fits the former class but not the latter. However, the difference is only in the details of the
mechanics; much of the reasoning used here would apply to the second class of policies
mutatis mutandis.
8See Nappi (1979, p. 61). For a particularly clear indication of this in the case of the
Coffee Agreement, see Short (1987), and Fisher (1972).
9Examples abound of sharp price movements following news relevant purely to future
policy. For example, on Monday, March 30, 1992, New York near-term futures prices for
coffee fell by 3.2% on news that the Brazilian Foreign Minister had resigned. See New York
Times, Tues, March 31, 1992, p. D18. For other examples, see: New York Times 3/5/1992, p.
D19; 3/6/1992, p. D13; 3/7/1992, p. 48; and 5/3/1991, p. D15. Wheat and, of course, oil,
provide many similar examples.
10For example, large private stocks overhanging the market had an important role in the
creation of new US grain price supports in January 1972. See Halow (1989, Chapter 5) for
an account. They were also important in the formation of the first International Coffee
Agreement. See Fisher (1972, p. 9). By contrast, the absence of large cocoa stocks has been
cited as a reason the International Cocoa Agreement talks failed during the same period
(Short, 1987, p. 293).
5the theory of asset price bubbles; and the theory of time-consistency in policy making, (i) In
some of the equilibria in this model, private agents cause a welfare loss by storing too much.
That is, ''hoarding" occurs. Wright and Williams (1984) find a numerical example of a
similar result in a model with an exogenously imposed price ceiling; the point there is that the
price ceiling distorts incentives in such a way as to make it too attractive to store in scarcity
and too unattractive in gluts. The question, approach and finding in this paper are different;
here, hoarding is harmful because it can induce an endogenous distortionary policy.
(n) Hart and Kreps (1986) showed that there is in general no reason for the
presumption that rational speculation will have a stabilizing effect on commodity prices. The
particular model they offered involved rational responses to noisy signals of future market
conditions. One contribution of the present paper is to offer a very different angle on the
question of price destabilizing speculation. In some regions of the parameter space for this
model, speculation is destabilizing in the sense that the only equilibrium which clears the
speculative market is random, even though the model is inherently nonrandom. However, this
is true only in the presence of government; the existence of the public sector as a strategic
player is what makes speculation destabilizing.
(lii) When there are multiple equilibria in this model, one of the equilibria is laissez
faire, and there is a sense in which the other one constitutes a bubble. This is not meant in
quite the usual sense of the word in financial theory, in which the price of an asset differs
from the (risk corrected) expected present value of a dividend stream, but rather in the sense
that the price of the commodity can become artificially inflated above its laissez faire
equilibrium level by a burst of spontaneous, self-fulfilling speculative enthusiasm. However,
6this form of bubble is different in an extreme way from all asset bubbles in the literature, as
demonstrated by the fact that it can be generated in a two-period model. Conventional
theories of asset bubbles require an infinite horizon of possibility, even if the bubble itself has
a finite lifetime (as in Blanchard, 1979). This has led to many logical difficulties for rational
bubbles as an equilibrium phenomenon (Diba and Grossman, 1988). However, none of that is
an issue here, because the mechanism is so very different: Instead of working purely through
traders1 expectations, here, bubbles arise because speculative behaviour changes government's
incentives1. In that regard, the present model is closest in spirit to the Obstfeld (1986) model
of exchange rate crises. However, here the setting and mechanisms are all very different, and
we hypothesize an optimizing government'2.
(IV) This paper adds to the literature on time consistent policy begun by Kydland and
Prescott (1977) the observation that a lack of commitment can lead not only to the
implementation of the wrong policy and a suboptimal outcome, but that it can actually lead
the outcome to be indeterminate, and can lead to randomization.
Section 2 lays out the model, Section 3 the discretionary equilibrium, Section 4 the
optimum under full commitment and comparison with the discretionary equilibrium, and
"Most theories of bubbles need an infinite chain of agents, each willing to buy at the
inflated price because it knows it can sell again at an inflated price. Here, that infinite chain
is broken: In the high price equilibrium, the government stands ready to buy at an inflated
price because of politics. It does not necessarily need to expect to resell.
12Variants of this argument are also made in McLaren (1992), where it is shown that
various kinds of exogenous commodity policy rules can make speculative bubbles possible,
and (1993), where it is shown that under some conditions the need for a buffer stock manager
to maintain a reputation with traders can lead to sunspot equilibria in an otherwise well-
behaved market.
7Section 5 discusses the implications of relaxing some key assumptions. Section 6 offers
concluding remarks.
2. The model.
Consider a country, "Home", which produces and exports a storable commodity. We
need to concern ourselves with four classes of agent. First, the producers of the commodity
all are citizens of Home. They reap a harvest of h each period, where h>0 is a constant, and
have no production costs. They can not store the commodity. Second, consumers all are
foreigners, and have per-period inverse demand given by:
(1) P(Q) = |3(Q - Q)° if Q<Q;
= 0 if Q>Q,
where Q is world consumption, Q > h is the satiation point, and (3, a > 0. Third, speculators
all are foreigners and can costlessly store any amount of the commodity without depreciation
from one period to the next. Each speculator seeks to maximize her expected capital gains.
All three of these classes of agent take price as given.
The fourth class of agent is government. We will ignore all foreign governments in
what follows. The Home government has two policy instruments available: poll taxes and
open market purchases of the commodity. The government is concerned with the well-being
of its taxpayers at large and also of the producers of the commodity. We allow for the
possibility that the producers are politically favored compared with other taxpayers. Thus, the
government maximizes the present value of domestic welfare, which in a given period is
measured by:
P(Q) 9h - C(B),
where B is net government purchases of the commodity in that period, C(B) is the fiscal cost
of the price support policy, and 9>1 is a parameter measuring the political clout of the
producers'3. The cost is given by:
C(B) = 0 if B=0;
= P(Q)B + K if B>0,
where K>0 is a fixed cost of administration required to have any active market intervention.
This should be thought of as comprising the costs of hiring an administrator and staff,
providing for offices and overhead, and perhaps building warehouse space14. It could also be
thought of as including the political resources required to get a farm bill through Congress,
which would have an opportunity cost in terms of other legislation that will receive less
attention than it otherwise would. If 0=1, the government has a terms of trade motive for
purchasing some of the commodity and thus increasing its price. If 9>1, it has an additional
13This approach can be extended quite mechanically to the analysis of an ICA. We would
need to write down the objective functions of the consumer and producer country
governments; the former would include a term for the income of foreign producers, to
represent the foreign aid motive of consumer participation in the ICA. The actual policy
enacted would then be the outcome of a bargaining process. This would differ from the
model presented here in details only.
14Administrative costs can be significant. A recent estimate put administrative costs of
US farm programs at $600 million per year. Gardner (1992, p. 85).
9redistnbutive motive for doing so.
All agents have a discount rate of zero. There are two periods. At the beginning of
period 1, speculators have an inherited stock of the commodity given by S>0. During that
period, they must form a forecast for the next period price and decide how much to store.
Inventories carried at the end of period 1 are denoted I>0. In period 2, speculators sell their
stocks (since with the world ending there is no reason to keep them), and government
purchases an amount B>0 (the government has no stocks to begin with). Note that with no
period 3, there is no meaningful distinction in period 2 between purchasing to store and
purchasing to destroy15. With these assumptions, world consumption equals (S+h-I) in period
1 and (I+h-B) in period 2.
There are two policy regimes of interest. Most of what follows will focus on the case
in which the government cannot commit itself in advance to a value for B: the discretionary
equilibrium. In this case, government chooses B in period 2 to maximize welfare given I;
understanding this, speculators in period 1 attempt to forecast the period 2 price and their
collective behaviour determines I. We will compare this with the regime in which
government can commit itself to B at the beginning of period 1. In both cases, the market
must clear at each moment, and that means that consumers must be on their demand curve
and expected capital gains from storage must equal zero. This implies that the price and
15This could also (equivalently) be interpreted as a policy in which the government pays
farmers the market price not to harvest some portion of the crop already planted, which is
approximately what the US government did with grain farmers in 1972. See Halow (1989,
Chapter 5).
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hence world consumption of the commodity must be equal in the two periods16. This gives us
the market clearing condition:
(2) I = (S+B)/2.
Thus, in the absence of government, the equilibrium would be unique and trivial: I = S/2;
consumption in each period equals h + S/2; price in each period equals P(h + S/2). This, of
course, maximizes (unweighted) world welfare.
Every characteristic of equilibrium that follows is unchanged if we multiply (3 and K
by a common factor, so henceforth we assume without loss of generality that (3=1. We also
assume that a< l , so that the demand curve is concave, because it makes much of the analysis
easier, although it will be clear that much of what follows will also hold for values of a
above 1. The role of concavity will be discussed in later sections. Finally, we make the
following assumption on demand:
Assumption I. Demand is brisk; precisely, Q > (l+a0)h.
This simply avoids some annoying taxonomy.
16A period 2 price strictly below the period 1 price together with 1=0 would also be
consistent with market clearing but would be impossible in this model because S>0 and B>0.
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3. The Discretionary Equilibrium.
3. A. Period 2: The Government's Decision.
Taking I as given, government in period 2 chooses B>0 to maximize:
W(B, 1) - 4>(B)K,
subject to B e [0, I+h], where (j)(0) = 0 and <j)(B) = 1 if B>0, and:
(3) W(B, I) = P(I + h - B)[9h - B].
Assume for the moment that a price support program is established, so that B>0. Then the
net marginal benefit to procurement is:
(4) WB(B, I) = -P '(I + h - B)9h - P(I + h - B) + P'(I + h - B)B.
The first term is the producer benefit and the second and third terms give the marginal fiscal
cost. It is straightforward to verify using (1) that this marginal benefit is positive if B<B*(I)




Assumption 1 implies that this is always less than I+h, ensuring positive consumption. Thus,
the optimum is given by B*(I) where this is positive, which is where I > Q - (l+oc0)h, and
zero elsewhere17. Since consumption in period 2 is equal to (I+h-B), (5) implies consumption
of:
(6) * = Q + al + (l-Q)ah
(1 + « )
for I > Q - (l+a6)h and (I+h) elsewhere. Thus, we can write the maximized welfare
function under the assumption of an active policy as follows.
< Q - (1 + aQ)h
.(<?-/+(e-i)*r<0 if
It is important to observe that this is a decreasing function. An increase in the overhang of
stocks on the market can only hurt the export country government.
!7For high enough I, this implies consumption above Q and therefore, by (1), a price of
zero. In this case, the government will be indifferent between many values of B which all
give a welfare value of zero. For concreteness we still let B=B*(I).
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Now all of this has been based on the assumption that the government will choose an
active policy. This will be the optimal action when A(I) = W*(I)-W(0,I) > K. From (1) and
(3),
\{Q - I - h)aQhif I < Q - h;
Qifl> Q- h.
Figure 1 shows the determination of the gain from intervention function A(I). Note that with
a<l , W(0,I) is a concave function of I wherever it is positive, and W*(I) is convex. Since the
envelope theorem guarantees that they have the same derivative with respect to I at
I = Q-(l+a9)h, this guarantees that A(I) is strictly increasing from Q-(l+oc0)h to Q-h.
Thereafter, A(I) decreases because W*(I) does. Thus, A is a quasiconcave function with a
support of [Q-(l+a8)h, Q+(9-l)h] and a maximum at Q-h. Denote this maximum by A.
The shape of A can be readily interpreted. First, the gain from intervention is small
when the overhang (I) is small because in that case it is not optimal for the government to do
much even if it has incurred the fixed cost of intervention. This is so because the marginal
fiscal cost of procurement is high and the producer price benefit is small — both because the
price is already close to the maximum. (Recall (4) and the assumed concavity of the demand
curve.) Second, the gain from intervention is small when the overhang is very large because
then in order to keep the price from falling very close to zero the government must acquire
huge stocks and therefore incur a huge fiscal cost. Thus, the optimal policy is to allow the
price to fall quite close to zero and therefore welfare is close to what it would be without
intervention. Thus, with I small, welfare is near its ideal level even if government does
nothing; with I large, the situation is fairly hopeless and nothing will help much. It is only
14
for intermediate levels of the overhang that there is much of a benefit from intervention.
Thus, if K £ (0,A), it is optimal to establish a price support program if and only if
I E (I',I"), where I' is (as shown in Figure 1) a number in the interval (Q-(l+a0)h, Q-h),
I" is in the interval (Q-h, Q+(6-l)h), and A(r)=A(I")=K. Thus, equilibrium government
procurement equals B*(I) if le(l',l") and zero if I^(I',I"), and equilibrium consumption
equals Q*(I*) if le(\',l") and (I+h) > Q*(f) if I^(I',I"). Denote the equilibrium consumption
by Qe(I). Figure 2 shows the price, P(Qe(I)), as a function of I. It is the heavy, broken curve,
decreasing except for the upward jump at 1=1'. At that point the government is indifferent
between establishing price supports and inaction, and a small increase in the overhang of
inventories makes it decide to establish supports, with a consequent jump in price. Similarly,
the curve jumps down at 1=1", where the government is indifferent again between the two
courses.
It is immediate that a drop in administrative costs raises the likelihood of price
supports ceteris paribus. Precisely, differentiating A(I')=K and A(r')=W*(I")=K show that I'
is increasing in K and I" is decreasing in K. Similarly, I' is decreasing in 9 and I" is
increasing in 618: an increase in the importance of redistributive politics makes price supports
more likely, ceteris paribus. Further,
limK >or = Q-(l+a6)h, and limK >0I" = Q+(6-l)h, while
lsWe need to use the envelope result that (W*(I))'= -P(I+h-B*(I)) where B*(I)>0. We
get dl'/m = h[P(I'+h)-P(r+h-B*(I /))]/[-P(r+h-B*(r))-P /(r+h)9h]. The denominator
is positive because it is equal to A'(I'), which is positive because I ' < Q-h (see Figure 1).
Thus, the derivative is negative. For I", we get dV'/cQ = h>0.
15
" = Q-h.
(See Figure 1.) Finally, I'->0 as 0—>QO and I"—x» as 0—>oo. In other words, if the producers are
sufficiently powerful, there will be price supports regardless of the condition of the market.
3. B. Period 1: Speculative equilibrium: the rise of bubbles, and endogenous volatility.
Now we can put this together with the condition that speculative profits must be zero
to determine the equilibrium price. Essentially, this means finding solutions for I to (2), with
the equilibrium B as a function of I on the right hand side. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
Each of the upward sloping curves shows the period 1 price as a function of I for a different
value of initial stocks S. As indicated above, the heavy, broken, downward sloping curve
shows the period 2 price as a function of I. For a given S, an intersection of the two curves
gives an equilibrium level of I. For initial stocks of Sw as shown in panel (a), the unique
equilibrium level of inventory demand is Iw, which gives rise to a period 2 policy of laissez
faire.
The case of initial stocks Sx, as shown in panel (b), is a marked contrast. Here, there
are two equilibria, Ixl and Ix2. The former results in a low price in both periods and a policy
of laissez-faire, while the second results in a high price in both periods and a policy of price
supports. The reason is that if speculators accumulate stocks up to the level Ix2, and the
government then does nothing, the release of those stocks will push the price down to a level
that the government would find disastrous. This justifies incurring the fixed cost to establish
16
price supports; but once that cost has been incurred, an aggressive storage policy is optimal,
leading to a price above P(Ix!+h), even though the price that would have resulted from
inaction is well below P(Ixl+h). Thus, with S=SX, the equilibrium price is indeterminate. It
could remain at the low level, or it could be pushed to the high level by a self-fulfilling
bullish impulse of speculators. It is in this sense that the presence of government can
generate a bubble at states like Sx.
Finally, with initial stocks of Sy in panel (a), there is no nonstochastic equilibrium19.
If speculators store I" or more, there will be no price supports, and they will suffer capital
losses"0. If they store less, there will be price supports and they will enjoy positive capital
gains. Both outcomes are inconsistent with market clearing. One possible solution is to
allow government to randomize when it is indifferent. Using this escape, we have an
equilibrium in which speculators store I" and in period 2 the government establishes price
supports with probability p(Sy), where:
P(S + h - V)
p(Sy) = — ^ — e (0,1),
* P(I;/ + h - B*( I"))
and the government chooses laissez faire with probability (l-p(S )). Needless to say, this is
a strained description of policy formation in practice.
A more satisfying way of analyzing this case is as follows. Consider 5>0 and suppose
19There is also a range of values between Sx and Sy, omitted to avoid cluttering the
diagram, with a unique equilibrium in which price supports are established. See the next
subsection.
:0Strictly speaking, this will push the period 2 price all the way down to zero; obviously,
this is an artifact of the simple demand curve form used here; more realistic demand curves
with a similar shape would give the same result with a low but positive price.
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that s is a random variable, with mean zero, a continuous distribution, and support on
[-5, 8], which is realized in period 2. Further, suppose that 0 = 9 + s, where 0 is a constant
known to all. Thus, there is some small uncertainty ex ante about how political forces will
play out. For initial stocks of Sw or Sx, equilibrium will be almost exactly as described above
provided that 8 is sufficiently small; but for S , the equilibrium level of I will be such that for
s greater than some critical value s, supports will be established; for e<e, supports will not
be established; and the probability that e>e is equal to p(Sy), as defined above. This is an
equilibrium for any positive value of 8, no matter how small. Thus, policy in equilibrium
turns on tiny variations in the producers' political clout; the deciding factor may be a
senator's bad head cold on the day of the floor debate, making him less forceful than usual.
As 8 goes to zero, the set of values of I for which s is the deciding factor becomes
infinitesimal, but the set of values of initial stocks S that give rise to a value of I in this range
does not. Thus, the interaction between speculation and the political process takes tiny,
inconsequential variations in the supply and demand for price supports and magnifies them
into significant sources of uncertainty about future policy. In this sense, this interaction adds
volatility to a market that would otherwise have almost none.
In addition, if in between periods 1 and 2 there was a brief trading period during
which information about s was revealed, the price would fluctuate sharply with each piece of
news that had much effect on the conditional probability that s>s. Since with 8 small these
fluctuations will entail otherwise quite insignificant information, this would appear to outside
observers to represent "excess volatility" or irrationality in the reactions of market
participants, and yet it would be the result of fully rational competitive behaviour. It is worth
18
pointing out that there are times when commodity markets appear to behave much like this,
occurring precisely in periods of glut as suggested by the model.
For example, in March 1992 the coffee market was depressed by longstanding
surpluses. There were at the time no price supports, and the market's assessment of the
likelihood of new supports appears to have fluctuated widely based on fairly small bits of
news. On March 4, near futures prices in New York fell by 4.7% because there was no
announcement at the end of a meeting of producers21. The next day they fell an additional
2.4%, reportedly because Brazil failed to make its intentions clear2. On March 6, they shot
up by 4.7% because an association of Brazilian planters voted to support in principle talks on
resuming export quotas"3. On March 30, they plunged 3.2% on news that the Brazilian
Foreign Minister was resigning24. In a similar vein, on February 8, 1993, prices plunged by
8.5% when an International Coffee Association meeting in London on the possibility of new
supports adjourned without progress25; talks resumed shortly thereafter. Each of these pieces
of news is of tiny consequence when viewed in its context in the long process of international
negotiations, and yet each engendered a dramatic market response. It appears that in both
cases traders understood market conditions to be such that a tiny perturbation could make the
difference between aggressive supports and no supports; in other words, the action of market
21
 New York Times, 3/5/1992, p. D19.
22New York Times, 116192, p. D13.
2iNew York Times, 3/7/1992, p. 48.
24New York Times, March 31, 1992, p. D18.
25New York Times, 2/9/1993, p. D17.
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forces had pushed the market to a point like 1=1" in Figure 2.
Thus, we see at least three different kinds of equilibrium, depending on the level of
initial stocks and the local effect of a rise in stocks on government incentives. The next
subsection characterizes fully which type of equilibrium will occur for which portion of the
state space.
3. C. A full characterization and comparative statics.
Denote the smallest S consistent with multiple equilibria by Sm. Since increasing S
slides the upward-sloping period 1 price curve to the right through the diagram of Figure 2,
Sm is given by the point at which this curve just touches the active policy portion of the
period 2 price curve; see Figure 3. S"1 is thus defined by:
Sm+h-I' - I'+h-B*(I'),
or, using (5),
s m _ Q + ( 1 + 2 a ) I / - (1 + a 9 ) h
Similarly, denote the maximum S consistent with multiple equilibria by Sm. Again using
Figure 3, this must be given either by the point at which the period 1 price curve just leaves
the period 2 passive price curve ~ corresponding to the value of S denoted as S, in Figure 3
- or the point at which the period 1 price curve just leaves the period 2 active price curve —





 = Q + (1 + 2a)I / y - (1 + aG)h
:
 " (1 + a )
Similarly, defining (S^r, Sr) as the interval on which the equilibrium is random, we find
that Sr is the larger of S, and S2, (so Sr>Sm), and Sr = Q+I"-h. Thus, we have the following
proposition, which partitions the state space into five portions.
Proposition 1. (i) If S e [0, Sm], there is one equilibrium, and it involves no price supports.
(ii) If S e (Sm, Sm), there are two equilibria, one with price supports and the other without.
(iii) If S e [Sm, Sr], there is one equilibrium, in which there are no price supports if S2<Sibut
there are price supports if S2>S1.
(iv) If S e (S.r, Sr) there is no non-stochastic equilibrium, but there is an equilibrium with
random policy.
(v) If S > Sr, there is one equilibrium, and it involves a price of zero in both periods.
A corollary is that very high prices are always followed by certain laissez faire, while
very low prices are always followed by policy uncertainty and price volatility (leaving aside
the extreme case of a zero price)26.
A natural question is: Under what circumstances are the various types of equilibria
26Essentially a version of this proposition was offered by a coffee analyst for Cargill in
commenting on recent coffee market volatility in early May, 1991, when she explained:
"When the market gets this depressed, producers normally get together and start discussing
the possibility of what can be done." New York Times, May 3, 1991, p. D15.
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most likely9 As a preliminary to answering this, it is straightforward to show27 that there
exists a number K* e (0, A) such that if K<K*, S2>S1 and if K>K*, S2<S,. Further, K* is
increasing28 in 0, so K=K* defines an upward sloping frontier in (9, K) space. This neatly
partitions the parameter space into a region with high administrative costs and a weak
redistnbutive motive (K>K*), and a region with low administrative costs and a strong
redistributive motive (K<K*). (For convenience, we will speak of the function K*(9) and its
inverse 0*(K)). This partition tells us something about when bubble equilibria are most
likely:
Proposition 2. Bubbles are most likely if administrative costs and the importance of
redistributive politics are in an intermediate range. Precisely:
(i) (Sm-Sm) is increasing in K when K<K* and decreasing when K>K*.
(ii) Suppose that K>K*. Then (Sm-£m)>0, and a small increase in 0 will increase it; but for a
sufficiently large increase, the interval on which bubbles occur becomes empty.
Proof: (i) (S,-Sm) is increasing in I' and (S2-Sm) is increasing in (V-V). Since I'
is increasing in K and I" is decreasing in K, the result follows.
(ii) If K>K*, (Sm-Sm) = (S2-Sm) = (l+2a)[I"-I '] /( l+a). Recalling footnote 18, the
27Since I' is increasing in K and I" is decreasing in K, (S2 - S,)_is decreasing in K. It is
also continuous in K. Further, as K^O, T-> Q-(l+a0)h and I"j-> Q+(0-l)h (see Figure 1), so
(S, - S,)-^ 0(l+2a)h>O. Finally, as K-^A, I', I"-> (Q-h), so (S2 - S,)-> -(a0/(l+a))h <0.
Q.E.D.
28From the previous footnote, (S2—S^is decreasing in K, and from footnote 18, it is
increasing in 0. Since K* is defined by (S2-S])=0, this establishes the result.
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derivative of this with respect to 9 is positive. However, a sufficiently large increase in 9
crosses the K=K* frontier, so that Sm=S1=2I', and as noted above, for sufficiently large 9
holding all else constant, I'=0. Q.E.D.
This proposition highlights the basic character of the multiple equilibrium outcome: it
holds, in a well defined sense, only for intermediate values of the demand for, and supply of,
price supports. If the demand for supports is very weak or its supply very reluctant, there
will be no supports regardless of speculative behaviour, and equilibrium will be unique. If
the demand is very strong or the supply is very quick to accommodate, there will be supports
regardless of speculative behaviour, and equilibrium will be unique. It is only for in between
levels of these variables that multiple equilibria become a factor. A similar result applies to
the random equilibrium:
Proposition 3. Random equilibria are most likely when administrative costs and the
importance of redistributive politics are in an intermediate range. However, no matter how
strong the redistributive motive is, there is always the possibility of a random equilibrium.
Precisely:
(i) For any 9, Sr is minimized with respect to K by K=K*(9); and for any K, Sr is minimized
with respect to 9 at the point at which 9=9*(K).
(ii) For any 9, (Sr-Sr) is maximized at K=K*(9), and for any K, it is maximized at 9=9*(K).
( i i i )Lim e _[(S r -S r ) ]>0 .
Proof: Immediate, once one verifies mechanically that dS}/dQ<0; 5S1/oK>0; 5S2/c9>0;
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dSJdK<0- c[Sr-S,]/£e>0; 5[Sr-S,]/dK<0; 5[Sr-S2]/36=0; c[Sr-S2]/dK>0. Q.E.D.
The reasoning here is similar to that for the previous proposition. However, no matter
how large 8 becomes, there will always exist a level of S high enough to make government
indifferent between supports and no supports in equilibrium; and as 0 rises, the rising gap
between the supported and unsupported prices for any I means that the range of initial stocks
for which this happens does not vanish.
4. Comparison with Full Commitment: the Failings of Discretion.
4. A. The full commitment solution.
The assumed inability of the government to commit itself leads in general to a
suboptimal outcome. There are three ways in which it could be suboptimal: It could result in
the wrong level of price supports, it could lead to no supports when supports are optimal, and
vice versa. Thus, equilibrium may err in choice of level or in choice of regime, with one
possible failure of level and two of regime choice. It will be seen that all three failures are
possible, but to see this, we first need to review the optimization problem under
commitment29.
29In general, it is possible that the full optimum under commitment will involve
randomization as a way of circumventing the fixed cost. Here we will examine only
nonrandom solutions, for simplicity. I am grateful to Joshua Aizenman for pointing this out
to me.
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If the Home government is able to commit itself publicly to a value of B at the
beginning of period 1, it chooses B to maximize the full two-period welfare function:
P(S+h-I)eh + P(I+h-B)[9h - B]
minus administrative costs if any, understanding that its choice of B will determine I through
the market clearing condition (2). Substituting this market clearing condition in, the problem
is to maximize:
V(B, S) -




Assume for the moment that B>0. The marginal benefit of promised procurement is then:
(8) VB(B,S) = -Ap'f £ - ? + h)[2Qh -B] -
This is positive if B<B(S) and negative if B>B(S), where
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(9) B(S) = 2(1 + aQ)h + S - 2Q
1 + a
Assumption 1 implies that this is always smaller than S+2h. Thus, if B(S)<0, the optimum is
B=0; and in all other cases, the optimum is B=B(S). This gives a maximized welfare level
of:
V(S) -
V(Q,S) ifS< 2[Q ad)h]
( 1 + < x ) ( 1 + « )
0 ifS > 2[Q + (0
£ + (6 -
2
+ a)





By contrast, if no price supports are established, the welfare level is:
(11)
0 i
- •£ - h)aQh if S
- h].
Defining the gain from price supports as A(S) = V(S)-V(0,S), the government will
commit to supports if and only if A(S)>K. This decision has qualitatively all of the same
properties as the second-period problem under discretion, and indeed, it can quickly be
verified that A(S) = 2A(S/2) for all S.
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4. B. The level of price supports.
Substituting the market clearing condition (2) into (4) yields the marginal benefit to
procurement in period 2 in equilibrium under discretion, when B>0:
- B] - P(*^* +h\.
For any B, this is strictly less than the marginal benefit under commitment as shown in (8).
This and the quasiconcavity of W and V yield a strong conclusion about the comparison of
the two.
Proposition 4. If the equilibrium under discretion and the optimum under commitment both
involve price supports, then the level of procurement and hence the price are strictly higher
under commitment than under discretion.
Thus, if both regimes involve price supports, then the discretionary solution is inferior
because it is not aggressive enough (from the point of view of the exporting country, of
course). The reason is clear from the expressions for VB and WB: An increase in period 2
procurement commitment at the beginning of period 1 leads speculators to bid up the price
right away, giving two periods of benefit to producers. However, an increase in ex post
procurement in period 2 raises the price in period 2 only, thus giving farmers only one period
of benefit. Thus, although the marginal cost of procurement is the same in both cases, at a
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given procurement level the marginal benefit to the government at the moment it makes its
decision is always smaller under discretion. Speculators, understanding this, will always bid
the price up to a lower level under discretion than under commitment.
Note that moving from discretion to commitment in this case has redistributional
implications within Home: it makes taxpayers poorer and farmers richer. However, the loss
to taxpayers is necessarily less than 9 times the gain to producers.
4. C. Failures of regime choice.
The first possible error of regime choice is that the discretionary equilibrium could
lead to laissez faire while the full optimum calls for supports. We will say in this case that
the government is "stuck in neutral:" It would like to have an activist policy, but it is unable
to do anything because it cannot convince speculators to give it a hand. Second, the
discretionary equilibrium could lead to price supports while the full optimum calls for laissez
faire. We will then say that the government has been "trapped" by the activity of speculators
into providing price supports. Both failures can occur under the right circumstances.
First, for the government to get stuck in neutral we need A(S)>K, so that supports are
desirable, while A(S/2)<K, so that laissez faire is an equilibrium under discretion. (Recall that
if no price supports are expected, (2) implies that I=S/2.) This is possible whenever
A(S)>A(S/2); but since A(S)=2A(S/2), this is true whenever A(S) is positive. This means that
it is generically possible for the government to get stuck in neutral under discretion, provided
only that K lies in the right range.
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Proposition 5. Whenever price supports are desirable, the discretionary government can
nonetheless get stuck in neutral provided administrative costs lie in an intermediate range.
Precisely, supports are optimal and yet B=0 is a discretionary equilibrium if and only if:
(i) S G [ 2(Q-(l+a9)), 2(Q+(9-l)h) ];
(ii) K G [A(S/2), 2A(S/2)].
This interval for K is at its widest in the interior of the range, when S = 2[Q-h].
This result comes from essentially the same source as Proposition 4: Ex post, the
government has a much smaller stake in price supports than it did ex ante. If S and K are in
the indicated range, the government would be willing to incur the fiscal cost of supports in
return for two periods of high price, but not for only one. This is why laissez faire is
simultaneously undesirable and an equilibrium.
By contrast, the conditions under which the government can be "trapped" into
providing supports are much more complex to derive. The Appendix derives the following:
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Proposition 6. (1) The government can be "trapped" by speculators into providing price
supports in a neighborhood of S = 2[Q - (l+0a/(l+oc))h] if and only if demand is sufficiently
concave; precisely, if and only if a < 0.925316.
(ii) The government can be trapped into establishing supports with S near
2[Q - (l+0a)h] if and only if demand is sufficiently concave; precisely, if and only if oc<l/V2.
(ui) Whenever the government can get trapped into providing supports, a drop
in K will put it into the range where the government can get stuck in neutral.
(iv) Whenever the government can get trapped into providing supports, both
supports and laissez faire are equilibria.
Proposition 6 shows that it is possible for the government to be trapped by speculators
into providing price supports provided that demand is sufficiently concave. The reason for
the importance of concavity is clear. Let I*(S) be the inventories held in a discretionary
equilibrium30 with price supports and initial stocks S; see Appendix equation (A.I). Denote
by QL= (S/2 + h) laissez-faire consumption per period; by QD= [(S-B*(I*(S)))/2 + h] per-
period consumption under a discretionary equilibrium with price supports; by QDL=
[(S+B*(I*(S)))/2 +h] second-period consumption off the equilibrium path of the discretionary
equilibrium with supports, in which the government chooses laissez-faire after the market has
anticipated supports; and by Qc= [(S-B(S))/2 +h] per-period consumption under commitment
30Here we assume that the discretionary equilibrium is nonrandom, which is the only case
of interest because we are discussing a situation in which the government would not choose
supports under full commitment. When the discretionary equilibrium is random, A(S/2)>K
because pure laissez faire is not an equilibrium, but then A(S)=2A(S/2)>K and the government
would choose supports under commitment.
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with the optimal positive level of supports, B(S). Let pj =P(Q,), and so on; pDL < pf < pD
< pc. The condition that price supports are not optimal under commitment implies:
K > 2(pc-pL)Gh - P cB > 2(pD-pL)9h - pDB*(I*(S)), so
(12) 2(pD-pL)9h < pDB*(r(S)) + K.
In other words, the price rise is too small relative to the fiscal cost of the policy to be
justified (for the optimal level, and a fortiori for the sub-optimal pD). On the other hand, the
condition that supports are an equilibrium implies that:
(13) (pD-pDL)0h > pDB*(I*(S)) + K.
In other words, the price drop if the government disappoints the market is large relative to the
fiscal cost of the policy. Putting (12) and (13) together yields:
2(PD-PL) < (PD-PDL)-
However, since (Qm-QD) = B*(I*(S)) and (QL-QD) = B*(I*(S))/2, this is the same as the
statement that the arc slope of the demand curve between QD and QDL is greater in absolute
value than it is between QD and QL. But this is a statement of concavity. The point is that in
this setting the benefit to policy arises from a rise in price. For the government to be trapped
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into establishing supports, the prospects for a rise in price must be modest ex ante, but the
threat of a price drop must be large ex post if the market is forced to a lower point on the
demand curve by an accumulation of stocks. This requires strictly concave demand.
4. D. The Welfare Loss from the ''Trap".
It was noted above (in Proposition 6) that when the government can be trapped into
providing supports, there are two equilibria. In that situation it is easy to show that the loss
in world welfare from the equilibrium with supports is always large. For concreteness here,
set 0=1. If we measure world welfare by the unweighted sum of each agent's surplus, we
need to account for the change in producers', consumers', taxpayers' and speculators' surplus.
Using the notation just introduced, the difference in producers' surplus between the two
equilibria is 2(pD-pL)h. The change in consumers' surplus is:
PD
(14) - 2 / D ( p ) d p < -{pD - pL)
PL
S
 + 2 * -
where the function D is the inverse of the function P and the inequality follows by the
concavity of demand. The change in taxpayers' surplus is -pDB*(I*(S))-K. The change in
speculators' surplus is simply the change in the value of their original stock, (pD-pL)S.
Adding all of these up, we find the following lower bound for the change in world welfare31:
31In deriving this bound, use is made of (5), (A.I), (14), (12), and the fact, derived in the
Appendix, that S must be no greater than S" for the "trap" to be possible, where S" is a
constant defined in the Appendix.
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1 + a
1 + 2 a (PD
Thus, the world welfare loss is always at least as great as the nse in value of the per
period harvest. If a is small, the lower bound is close to the rise in the value of both
harvests, or the total value of rents transferred to producers32.
5. Qualifications and Partial Remedies.
It is worth mentioning four areas in which this model's assumptions have been
restrictive, and the implications of loosening them.
(i) Government delay. In this model, speculators can act in period 1 but (apart from
the case of full commitment), the government is hamstrung until period 2. The assumption
that government cannot move as quickly as speculators is hardly unrealistic; major farm
legislation and international commodity agreements both take months or years to negotiate
and then a further delay to implement. However, it should be pointed out that if that
assumption is relaxed and government as well as speculators can store in period 1, some but
not all of the phenomena derived above disappear.
"This is, of course, a form of rent-seeking problem, but in contrast with the classic
analyses of rent-seeking (Krueger (1974), Posner (1975)), we have a lower bound on the
welfare loss, and that lower bound is below the total value of rent transferred. There are
three key reasons for the difference. First, there is only one agent engaged in rent-seeking,
namely the Home government; competition in rent-seeking is key to those classic accounts.
Second, the fact that the rent-seeking agent is serving two interest groups complicates matters;
the fiscal concern of taxpayers puts a brake on the rent-seeking process in this model. Third,
a portion of the rents transferred "leak out" into the hands of foreign speculators.
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Suppose that in period 1 the government can choose to store an amount G; after seeing
the government's choice of G, the speculators form their expectations of period 2 and the
equilibrium level of I is determined. In period 2, speculators sell all of their stocks but the
government may choose to retain an amount B at the end of the period. The government's
period 2 objective function is now:
P(G + I + h - B)(9h + G - B) - (j)(G, B)K,
where 4>(G, B) = 0 if B=0 or G>0 and 1 otherwise33. This is to be maximized by choice of B
subject to 0 < B < (G + I + h), yielding B(G, I). It is immediate to verify that
0 < Bt < BG < 1, where subscripts indicate partial derivatives. The level of I is determined by
the market clearing condition:
P(S + h - G - I) = P(I + G + h - B(G, I)),
yielding a function I(G, S). It is straightforward to verify that -1 < IG < -1/2. Thus, an
increase in G reduces private stocks but less than one-for-one, so consumption falls. This can
continue until private stocks are zero if the government wishes.
The conclusion is that a government that can store in period 1 can not suffer from a
price support policy that is not aggressive enough. It can solve that problem by choosing an
"Thus, the assumption here is that administrative costs are incurred only in establishing,
not in maintaining, a price support program. Alternative assumptions would reduce the
benefit from first-period public storage.
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appropriate positive level of G. The reason is that public sector storage gives the government
an additional stake in keeping the price high in period 2; speculators, understanding that,
expect higher prices in period 2 than they would have otherwise and bid the period 1 price up
as welP4. At the same time, the government's first period purchases will have no direct effect
on the present value of the government's objective function because the government, like
private speculators, will simply make zero profits on them. Further, obviously it is impossible
for the government to be "stuck in neutral" if it can incur the administrative costs and begin
storing in period 1. The only possible failure of discretion that remains when government can
store in period 1 is that it can be trapped into price supports when they are suboptimal, and
this can happen under exactly the same circumstances as previously.
(ii) Futures markets35. Futures market transactions can plausibly help the government
overcome its commitment difficulties. If the producers do not have access to futures markets
but the government takes a position F maturing in period 2, where F>0 is short and F<0 is
long, then the government's period 2 objective function before deducting administrative costs
is:
P(I+h-B)[0h-B] + p,F - P(I+h-B)F,
34Note that because of this effect on government incentives, government cannot duplicate
the outcome of an equilibrium with private storage by storing an amount equal to what the
private sector would have stored otherwise; the mere act of acquiring the speculators' stock
will make the speculators want to acquire some more. This is an additional difference
between the discretionary situation and commitment; in the latter case, public and private
stocks are perfect substitutes.
35I am grateful to Bill Lehr for suggesting this section.
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where pf is the futures price, which is determined in period 1. The first term is as before; the
last term is the cost of procuring the commodity on the spot market to settle the contract, and
the middle term is the revenue from the settlement. (The transaction does not directly affect
the period 2 price because the commodity is sold to consumers right after the settlement.) It
is straightforward to see that the optimal B is decreasing in F; a short position gives the
government a stake in lower prices. As a result, speculators, seeing the government take a
short position in period 1, will bid the period 1 price down and hold smaller inventories than
they otherwise would. Analogously, a long position will fulfill exactly the role of government
storage outlined above, and convince speculators to bid the price up. In addition, the
derivative of A with respect to F is equal to P(I + h) - P(I + h - B) < 0, so that with a large
enough short position, the government can effectively commit not to establish supports. If
that happens, the position then has no additional effect on welfare or resource allocation;
equilibrium will drive pf to equal the anticipated period 2 spot price (pL), so the government
will make zero profits on its position, and the outcome will be exactly the same as laissez
faire. Thus, if the government has access to a futures market with sufficiently long-term
contracts it can capture all of the benefits of full commitment.
This optimistic outcome is unlikely in practice, however. First, in practice, commodity
futures contracts are typically available only in fairly short maturities, not usually much
exceeding a year, and thus could offer only short term commitment. Individually negotiated
forward contracts could fill the same function and could conceivably be of much longer term,
but the transactions costs from such arrangements are typically higher. Second, in practice
any futures contract that is not a hedge on a cash position entails considerable risk. Since
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random variation in supply and demand has been assumed away in this model, that cost does
not appear, but it is extremely important in actual trading36. Third, aggressive manipulation of
futures markets would be likely to run afoul of regulators37. Finally, if the government must
set up a bureaucracy to engage in futures market transactions in order to avoid getting trapped
into a program of price supports, it will incur a considerable amount of administrative cost
from that program alone. It may well be that that administrative cost defeats the purpose of
avoiding price supports, and that even with the futures market option the government will
choose to give up and resign itself to a future with controls.
(Hi) Functional form. The functional form for demand used in this model is similar in
many respects to linear demand. It has very high elasticity at high prices and very low
elasticity at low ones. Any demand curve will behave similarly if there is a maximum price
above which sales are zero and there is a maximum quantity which the market will absorb.
However, the multiple equilibria observed in this model appear to be impossible to generate
36There are two important historical cases of a government or government created body
attempting to use futures markets in this way. In the first half of the 1980's, the International
Tin Council buffer stock manager established large long positions on the London Metals
Exchange, in part to convince the market that the announced price support levels were
credible. See Anderson and Gilbert (1988) and Gibson-Jarvie (1986). In the late 1970's,
Brazil and Columbia apparently tried a similar maneuver on the New York Coffee, Cocoa and
Sugar exchange to support coffee prices. See Greenstone (1981). Both episodes were
financially disastrous for the protagonists.
"See Greenstone (1981) for an account of the relevant issues in the coffee case. U.S.
regulators generally are inclined to prosecute anything smacking of manipulation of an
exchange, but there is a grey area encountered when the putative manipulator is a sovereign
state. At any rate, sustained manipulation would be unlikely to be tolerated. By contrast, the
tin case centered on the LME, one of the least regulated of commodity exchanges at the time,
but ultimately this was part of the problem; the lack of safeguards paved the way for the 1985
crash. See Gibson-Jarvie (1986) for a detailed account.
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with an isoelastic demand curve; with elasticity above unity, B=0, and with elasticity below
unity, A is a decreasing function. In general, whenever government would derive some gross
benefit from price supports, and the gain, A, from such supports is increasing in the size of
the overhang, multiple equilibria are possible; and whenever the gain is decreasing in the
overhang, an equilibrium with induced randomness is possible. Which is these will be found
in a given case is sensitive to the shape of demand.
(iv) Egalitarianism and risk aversion. We restricted government here to a welfare
function that was linear in the surplus of taxpayers and producers. However, if the
government's values or the political process places more weight on poorer members, the
welfare function will be strictly quasiconcave in the two groups' surpluses38. For example,
the welfare function could be:
v(P(I+h-B)h) + w(Y-P(I+h-B)B-(j)(B)K),
with Y equal to taxpayers's income in the absence of commodity policy, (j> as in section 2,
and v and w both strictly concave. In this case, for B>0, A' will be given by:
[v'(P(I+h-B)h)h - w'(Y-P(I+h-B)B-K)B]P'(I+h-B) - v;(P(I+h)h)P'(I+h)h.
If farmers are sufficiently heavily weighted and if v is sufficiently concave, the last term,
38See, for example, Atkinson (1978) for the social welfare interpretation, and Peltzman
(1976) for a political interpretation.
38
which is positive, will dominate, implying that the gain function A will always be increasing.
This will mean that multiple equilibria will become more important, and regions with the
random equilibrium will vanish. The fact that it makes the objective function more concave
in I will also make it easier for situations to arise in which the government is "trapped" into
providing price supports -- even in cases in which the demand curve is not itself concave.
This is important, because in practice egalitarianism is an important impetus behind
commodity policies. Gardner (1987) found evidence that U.S. farm commodity policy
formation has had a strong egalitarian element in it, responding to a sharp drop in farm
incomes as if lower income households have a higher weight. Note that this mathematical
conclusion flows also from the standard interpretation of commodity policy as a response to
missing insurance markets in the presence of risk aversion (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981),
which could be a valid interpretation here if, say, the initial value of S or h was random and
uninsurable for some reason39. If this interpretation is right, the model in this paper may have
understated the scope for "bubbles" and "traps" in the formation of commodity policy.
6. Conclusion.
Perhaps the major point developed in the analysis above is that in analyzing the
establishment of a commodities policy, one should take close account of the effect of
speculative behaviour on the incentives of government. The kind of market equilibrium that
"Analogously, this is a common interpretation of much trade protection, some of which
would be susceptible to a similar analysis. See Eaton and Grossman (1987) and Baldwin
(1981).
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emerges when government's incentive to intervene is increasing in private inventories may be
dramatically different from that with a decreasing incentive. Further, in both cases the
interaction between speculators and government may be rich, and can lead to an increased
volatility.
One of the consequences is that the kind of equilibrium that will result depends quite
closely on the shape of the demand curve that is perceived by market participants. This
suggests a natural direction for empirical enquiry; there are many econometric attempts to
estimate demand elasticities in commodity markets, but attempts to test a hypothesis of
concavity, for example, are uncommon. It is unlikely that such second-order measurements
can be made with much precision on available consumption data for most commodities, since
degrees of freedom may be too scarce, but may be worth trying nonetheless.
Casual observation suggests that the perceived shape of demand relations may be quite
complex in some cases. For example, in coffee, major price support programs have been
established in periods of extreme glut40 and in periods of extreme scarcity.41 On its face, this
would seem to suggest a gain-from-intervention function shaped like an inverted U, rather
than the quasiconcave hump (recall Figure 1) of the model presented here, and thus a demand
curve quite steep at high and low prices but flatter in between.42 This would require at least a
40
 This is the case with the original valorizations, beginning in 1906, and with the original
International Coffee Agreement in 1962. Krasner (1973) and Fisher (1972).
41
 This is the case with the withholding program and futures market manipulations of the
late 1970's. Greenstone (1981).
42It could also be rationalized by a very convex demand curve and a very concave farmer
utility function or political support function (as discussed in section 5(iv) above).
Distinguishing between these two explanations empirically may be tricky.
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cubic functional specification, and since extremes of price are infrequently visited4j,
identification of such higher derivatives may be difficult.
However, the general point has been made. When commodities policy is treated as
endogenous and the commodity is storable, the shape of government incentives as a function
of the state of the market is a crucial determinant of the type of equilibrium that will emerge.
43This is discussed in some detail by Deaton and Laroque (1992).
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Appendix.
This appendix derives the following proposition.
Proposition 6. (i) The government can be "trapped" by speculators into providing price
supports in a neighborhood of S = 2[Q - (l+6a/(l+a))h] if and only if demand is sufficiently
concave; precisely, if and only if a < 0.925316.
(ii) The government can be trapped into establishing supports with S near
2[Q - (l+6a)h] if and only if demand is sufficiently concave; precisely, if and only if a<l/V2.
(iii) Whenever the government can get trapped into providing supports, a drop
in K will put it into the range where the government can get stuck in neutral.
(iv) Whenever the government can get trapped into providing supports, both
supports and laissez faire are equilibria.
It is useful to define for each S the level of inventory demand I*(S) that satisfies
I=(B*(I)+S)/2 for I. By (2), this is the level of inventories at the beginning of period 2 in a
discretionary equilibrium with price supports and with initial stocks equal to S. By (5), this is
unique and is given by:
(A.i) j * ( S ) =
(1 + 2 a )
The condition under which the government may be "trapped" into providing supports
is then simply A(S)<K and A(I*(S))>K. Thus, we are looking for conditions under which
A(S)<A(I*(S)). In doing this, it is useful to define three threshold levels of S. S' is defined
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as the level of S such that B*(I*(S)) is equal to zero. S" is defined as the smallest solution to
P(r(S")+h)=0, and S'" as the smallest solution to P(r(S'")+h-B*(r(S"')))=0. These are of
interest because A(l"(S)) exceeds zero only on (S', S'") and attains its maximum at S". By
(1), (5) and (12), these thresholds are:
S' = 2[Q -
S" = 2[Q -
S'" = 2[Q + (6/2 - l)h].
Similarly, we define S' by B(S')=0, S" by P(S72+h)=0, and S'" by P(h+(S"'-B(S"'))/2)=0.
These similarly define the support and maximum of A. From (1) and (9), these are:
S' - 2 [ Q - ( 1 +
S" = 2[Q - h];
S'" = 2[Q + (9-
Note that S'">S">S\ S'">S">S', S '=S\ S">S", and SW>S/W. Thus, the support of A(S) is a
right-handed extension of the support of A(I*(S)), and A(I*(S)) peaks to the left of than A(S).
This is illustrated in Figure 4, for the case a=0.8, h=0.2, Q=l, and 9=1.5.
Since A(S) = 2A(S/2) VS, we know that A(S") = 2A(r(S")) > 2A(I*(S")) > A(r(S")),
and so for S>S", A(S)>A(I*(S)). (See Figure 4.) Thus, if the "trap" is to occur, we must have
S<S". Two questions are: First, under what conditions does the peak of A(I*(S)) (which
occurs at S") poke above the A curve? And second, under what conditions does the initial
portion of A(I*(S)) (at S') rise more quickly than the initial portion of A?





The expression on the left hand side can be verified numerically to be positive (for ae [0 , 1])
if and only if a < 0.925316. Thus, we have verified (I).
Second, we investigate the behaviour of the two curves near S'. We know that
A(S')=A(S')=0, and the envelope theorem readily shows us that
Thus, in a (right-handed) neighborhood of S', the curve that dominates is the one with the
greatest second derivative. It is mechanical to verify:
= « • // / \2 JC21" ' ' J^~^
— + h)Qh - P'( —
2 2
From (12), this means that A(I*) is more convex than A at S' if and only if
2(1 + a)2
 > j
(1 + 2 a ) 2
or
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This, then, gives us (ii).
There is, finally, a simple relationship between the two types of regime choice failure.
Since we know that A(S)>A(S/2) always holds (where the function is positive), if
A(I*(S))>A(S), then A(r(S))>A(S)>A(S/2). Therefore, if K is such that the government can get
trapped into providing supports, a drop in K will put it into the range where the government
can get stuck in neutral. This is (iii). This inequality further shows that whenever the
government can get trapped into providing supports, necessarily both policy regimes are
equilibria: "traps" and "bubbles" go together. This is (iv). This completes the derivation of
Proposition 6.
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